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On continuum beliefs and psychiatric stigma: Similarity to a person with 
schizophrenia can feel too close for comfort 
Abstract 
Continuum belief interventions that blur boundaries between “normal” individuals and individuals with 
psychiatric problems have shown promise in reducing psychiatric stigma. Interventions to date have 
afforded participants considerable psychological distance from individuals with mental illness. An 
intervention that compels psychological closeness to individuals with mental illness may lead to 
increased anxiety/threat and an attenuated intervention effect on stigma. In a randomized experiment, 
one hundred thirty-five participants listened to a bogus interview involving an ostensible person with 
schizophrenia who shared numerous characteristics in common with participants. In the interview, the 
target person (1) did not verbally broach issues of similarity to “normal” people, (2) endorsed a continuum 
view, or (3) endorsed a categorical view. Participants then read a bogus research article on schizophrenia 
that (1) was agnostic with respect to the continuum/categorical distinction, (2) attested to a continuum 
view, or (3) attested to a categorical view. Correlational analyses demonstrated that greater endorsement 
of continuum beliefs predicted less stigma. Experimental analyses demonstrated that the continuum 
intervention had no effect on stigma. The continuum intervention increased participants’ feelings of 
anxiety/threat, measured via self-report and a lexical decision task. These findings might usefully inform 






This is the authors' accepted manuscript version of an article published in Psychiatry Research. The final 
published version is available through the publisher: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psychres.2018.10.070 
Creative Commons License 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 
License. 
This article is available at Fisher Digital Publications: https://fisherpub.sjfc.edu/psychology_facpub/20 
CONTINUUM BELIEFS  1 
Abstract 
Continuum belief interventions that blur boundaries between “normal” individuals and 
individuals with psychiatric problems have shown promise in reducing psychiatric stigma. 
Interventions to date have afforded participants considerable psychological distance from 
individuals with mental illness. An intervention that compels psychological closeness to 
individuals with mental illness may lead to increased anxiety/threat and an attenuated 
intervention effect on stigma. In a randomized experiment, one hundred thirty-five participants 
listened to a bogus interview involving an ostensible person with schizophrenia who shared 
numerous characteristics in common with participants. In the interview, the target person (1) did 
not verbally broach issues of similarity to “normal” people, (2) endorsed a continuum view, or 
(3) endorsed a categorical view. Participants then read a bogus research article on schizophrenia 
that (1) was agnostic with respect to the continuum/categorical distinction, (2) attested to a 
continuum view, or (3) attested to a categorical view. Correlational analyses demonstrated that 
greater endorsement of continuum beliefs predicted less stigma. Experimental analyses 
demonstrated that the continuum intervention had no effect on stigma. The continuum 
intervention increased participants’ feelings of anxiety/threat, measured via self-report and a 
lexical decision task. These findings might usefully inform the design of stigma reduction 
programming centered on continuum beliefs. 
 Keywords: psychiatric stigma; continuum beliefs; schizophrenia 
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1. Introduction 
Individuals with psychiatric problems are commonly rejected, avoided, devalued, and 
discriminated against (see Hinshaw and Stier, 2008, for a review). People with psychiatric 
problems are seen as incompetent (Sadler et al., 2012), dangerous/violent (Phelan et al., 2000; 
Wahl, 1995), child-like (Corrigan et al., 2001), and weak (Olmstead and Durham, 1976). Public 
stigma of mental illness has been remarkably persistent over time. That is, despite increased 
awareness of mental illness in most cultures, there is some evidence that the problem of public 
stigma has remained stable or even intensified (Schomerus et al., 2012). This pervasive public 
stigma limits the lives of individuals with mental illness in diverse ways. Public stigma reduces 
their ability to establish social connection (Sayce, 2000), secure employment (Bordieri and 
Drehmer, 1986), pursue educational opportunities (Van Brakel, 2006), and obtain housing (Page, 
1977). Psychiatric stigma is a serious social problem and it is increasingly seen as an important 
target of policy aimed at improving mental health care (Hogan, 2003; World Health 
Organization, 2001). 
Outgroup categorization of individuals with psychiatric problems fuels public stigma 
(Link and Phelan, 2001). That is, stigma is enabled to the extent that the public (the ingroup; 
“us”) appraises individuals with psychiatric problems (the outgroup; “them”) as occupying a 
distinct social category with rigid boundaries. Indeed, there is ample empirical evidence that 
stronger belief in categorical differences between individuals with and without mental illness 
predicts increased stigma (e.g., Thibodeau, 2017; Thibodeau et al., 2018) Similarly, strong belief 
in the biomedical origins of mental illness, which may underscore the “otherness” of individuals 
with psychiatric problems, also predicts critical dimensions of public stigma (see Haslam and 
Kvaale, 2015, for a review). 
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There are alternative ways of thinking about the nature of psychiatric problems. 
Continuum beliefs reflect the idea that psychopathology and normality are separate points on a 
fluid continuum. This view maintains that individuals with psychiatric problems are not 
categorically different from others. Rather, continuum beliefs emphasize fundamental 
similarities between psychopathology and the ordinary distress to which everybody is vulnerable. 
A sizeable body of correlational research indicates that stronger continuum belief predicts 
decreased stigma (Angermeyer et al., 2015; Makowski et al., 2016; Schlier et al., 2016; 
Schomerus et al., 2013; Thibodeau, 2017; Thibodeau et al., 2018; Wiesjahn et al., 2014; 
Wiesjahn et al., 2016) 
These correlational findings have stimulated considerable interest in the possibility of 
developing stigma reduction programming that centers on continuum belief. That is, can we 
intervene to increase the public’s embrace of continuum belief? If so, will weakened public 
stigma follow? Several studies have now evaluated these provocative questions. The small 
literature that has emerged is subject to important limitations including weak manipulations 
delivered mostly online and small intervention effects on key outcomes. Nevertheless, the 
evidence gathered to date suggests that continuum belief intervention may decrease important 
parameters of public stigma, including social distance (Schomerus et al., 2016; Thibodeau et al., 
2018), blame (Schomerus et al., 2016), and incompetence/unpredictability (Wiesjahn et al., 
2016). Moreover, in one study, continuum belief intervention led to increased appraisals of the 
recovery prospects of individuals with schizophrenia (Corrigan et al., 2017). 
The content of the continuum manipulations carried out to date merits some scrutiny. 
Two main approaches to intervention have been utilized. In one approach, participants read a 
short summary of academic research, written using journal-style prose (Wiesjahn et al., 2016) or 
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written to simulate a popular news article (Schomerus et al., 2016), attesting to similarities 
between individuals with mental illness and “normal” people. In a second approach, participants 
are introduced to a specific (but fictitious) individual and invited to see symptoms of his disorder 
as occurring commonly, albeit in attenuated form, in the “normal” population (Corrigan et al., 
2017; Thibodeau, 2017). A common thread running across all these studies is that the 
interventions have permitted participants to maintain considerable psychological distance from 
individuals with mental illness described in the manipulation texts. That is, by executing only 
abstract comparisons between people with mental illness and “normal” people in a generic sense, 
participants can avoid considering the personal implications of a continuum view and they can 
decline potentially uncomfortable reflection on similarities between themselves and people with 
mental illness. What would happen if an intervention shrunk this psychological distance by 
compelling participants to see stark similarities between themselves and an individual with 
mental illness? 
We can envision two possible outcomes of this different kind of continuum intervention. 
One possibility is that seeing individuals with mental illness as similar to one’s self would 
amplify the stigma reduction effect of continuum intervention. Participants may more readily 
confer ingroup status to individuals seen as uniquely similar to themselves (Gaertner et al., 
1993), thus facilitating a more vigorous rejection of outgroup status that helps to fuel the stigma 
of mental illness. We see a second possibility as more likely, however. We contend that a belief 
in the “otherness” of individuals with psychiatric problems is useful in that it affords safe 
psychological distance from mental illness. Continuum belief intervention that compels 
participants to see stark similarities between an individual with mental illness and themselves 
may force an uncomfortable confrontation with their own simmering sense of vulnerability. 
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Weakened perceptions of “otherness” could then lead to increased appraisals of threat, feelings 
of fear/anxiety, and ultimately, defensive rejection of the continuum intervention. Consider, for 
example, Wahl’s (1995) account of reading The Quiet Room, a memoir that describes co-author 
Lori Schiller’s first episode of psychosis at age 17 (Schiller and Bennett, 1994). In reflecting on 
parallels between Schiller and his own similarly aged daughter, Wahl reportedly searched “for 
evidence that [his] daughter was very different from (and thus less vulnerable than)” Schiller (pp. 
125-126). Motives to see people with mental illness as fundamentally different are very 
powerful. Thus, a type of continuum intervention that explicitly weakens these appraisals of 
“otherness” by compelling psychological closeness to an individual with mental illness may 
undermine the beneficial effects on stigma heretofore documented in the empirical literature. The 
purpose of the present research was to bring to bear empirical evidence on these competing 
hypotheses. 
 In this study, participants listened to an audio-recorded interview between a professor at 
their college and a target person who they were told has schizophrenia. This individual was 
described as having a large number of specific characteristics in common with participants, thus 
underscoring appraisals of stark similarity and encouraging feelings of psychological closeness. 
That is, the target person was described as a recent alumnus of their college; similar in age; 
matched for sex; possessing a youthful appearance, confirmed via presentation of a photograph 
that was displayed concurrent with playback of the interview; and having a first name common 
among the current generation of college students. Moreover, several elements of the interview 
were designed to reinforce appraisals of similarity or to render the manipulation more 
psychologically compelling. These include a manner of speech employed by many college 
students; outward manifestations of normality, absent verbal behavior that might indicate 
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psychosis; and speech targeted directly at listeners.  
The experimental manipulation was carried out via a combination of statements from the 
target person and follow-up reading. In the control condition, the target person did not verbally 
broach issues of similarities to, or differences from, “normal” people. A follow-up bogus 
research article was agnostic with respect to the continuum/categorical distinction. In the 
continuum condition, the target person made statements that reinforced similarities to “normal” 
people (e.g., “I’m not that different than you!”). The follow-up article attested to a continuum 
view of schizophrenia, thereby weakening a sense of “otherness” even further. In the categorical 
condition, the target person made statements that reinforced differences from “normal” people 
(e.g., “I’m totally different than you!”). The follow-up article attested to a categorical view of 
schizophrenia, thereby enabling some psychological distance from the target person. The 
categorical condition was included to (1) facilitate consistency with the published literature on 
continuum intervention; (2) conceptually oppose the continuum condition, which permitted us to 
evaluate implications of the full spectrum of “otherness;” and (3) rule out the possibility that 
continuum effects that may emerge are attributable to a nonspecific effect of (any) intervention. 
Our study allowed us to generate conclusions regarding schizophrenia, but perhaps not other 
disorders that may differ with respect to key parameters of public stigma. 
 Hypotheses were as follows. Given a continuum intervention that encourages 
participants’ contemplation of stark similarities with a target person with schizophrenia: 
(1) No beneficial effect of the continuum intervention, compared to the control and 
categorical interventions, on psychiatric stigma was expected. We utilized two 
measures of stigma: social distance and stereotyped attitudes. 
(2) The continuum intervention, compared to the control and categorical interventions, 
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should lead to an inflated sense of anxiety/fear and threat. We utilized three measures 
of momentary affect: the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson et 
al., 1988), a commonly used self-report measure of stigma-related emotion 
(Schomerus et al., 2013), and a lexical decision task (e.g., MacLeod and Matthews, 




 One hundred thirty-five undergraduates (103 women, 31 men, one participant declined to 
indicate biological sex; 83.6% White; 8.3% psychology majors, 28.8% nursing majors, 62.9% 
other; 43.0% reported having a family member with mental illness; M age = 18.7, SD = 1.2) were 
recruited using a participant management application (Sona Systems, Ltd., Tallinn, Estonia). 
They participated for course credit. The first author allocated participants to the control (n = 43), 
continuum (n = 46), or categorical (n = 46) or groups using computer-generated random 
sequences that yielded blocks fixed at size 3. 
2.2 Measures 
 2.2.1. Measures of psychiatric stigma. We administered two self-report measures of 
psychiatric stigma. The Social Distance Scale (SDS; Link et al., 1987) includes seven items that 
measured participants’ willingness to engage, at varying degrees of closeness (e.g., co-worker, 
neighbor) with the target person. Responses were recorded on four-point scales (1 = definitely 
willing, 4 = definitely unwilling). 
 A six-item semantic differential tool (Olmsted and Durham, 1976) was administered to 
measure stereotyped attitudes. Respondents rated both the target person and “Average Person” 
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on seven-point scales anchored by bipolar adjectives (e.g., safe-dangerous, valuable-worthless). 
Difference scores for all six items were then computed by subtracting ratings for “Average 
Person” from ratings for the target person. The six items were then averaged to form an overall 
index of stereotyped attitudes. We also executed separate analyses of two items, safe-dangerous 
and predictable-unpredictable, given their special relevance to schizophrenia stigma. 
 2.2.2 Measures of momentary affect. We administered a lexical decision task to 
measure the momentary accessibility of threat-related constructs. Using E-Prime stimulus 
presentation software (Psychology Software Tools, Inc.; Sharpsburg, PA), a series of 60 stimuli 
– words or non-words – were sequentially presented in random order via an Acer XF240H 
computer display (1920 x 1080 pixels, 144 Hz refresh rate). Participants were required to 
indicate, as quickly as possible using the e and i keys of the keyboard, whether the stimuli were 
words or non-words. E-Prime recorded the speed (in ms) with which participants logged their 
responses to each of the 60 stimuli. Responses keys were counterbalanced such that half of the 
participants pressed the e key for words and i key for non-words and the other half executed the 
opposite configuration. Stimuli were grouped into four categories consisting of (1) 12 anxiety 
words (e.g., afraid, nervous, anxious); (2) 12 death words (e.g., bury, grave, dying), responses to 
which are sensitive to feelings of threat (Schimel et al., 2007) (3) 12 neutral words (e.g., bottle, 
cabin, magnet); and (4) 24 phonetically plausible non-words (e.g., akmow, jalfig, yaskog). The 
four categories were matched with respect to stimulus length (i.e., number of letters); the three 
word categories were also matched with respect to word frequency, as per the English Lexicon 
Project database (Balota et al., 2007). 
 We administered two self-report measures of momentary affect. The Positive and 
Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson et al., 1988) includes 10 positive (e.g., enthusiastic, 
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alert, inspired) and 10 negative (e.g., distressed, irritable, hostile) items that captured 
participants’ current affective state. Responses were recorded on five-point scales (1 = very 
slightly or not at all, 5 = extremely). Two separate administrations of the PANAS were carried 
out: one prior to and one subsequent to the experimental manipulation. 
 A 10-item measure of emotional reactions (Schomerus et al., 2013) to the target person 
featured in the interview was also administered subsequent to the experimental manipulation. 
Consistent with previous work, items were grouped into fear (e.g., “I feel insecure”), anger (e.g., 
“I feel annoyed”), and prosocial (e.g., “I feel the need to help”) categories. Responses were 
recorded on five-point scales (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). 
 2.2.3.  Manipulation check. To evaluate participants’ responsiveness to the 
experimental manipulation, we administered a four-item scale that measured participants’ 
endorsement of continuum (e.g., “Anybody could develop schizophrenia under the right 
circumstances”) and categorical (e.g., “Symptoms of schizophrenia represent clear departures 
from the way normal people function”) views of schizophrenia (see Thibodeau, 2017). 
Responses were recorded on four-point scales (1 = strongly disagree, 4 = strongly agree). 
2.3 Procedure 
 First, participants provided informed consent to complete the study, which was approved 
by the local institutional review board. Second, they completed the pre-manipulation PANAS 
and two scales unrelated to the current study and thus not discussed here. Third, the experimenter 
delivered instructions pertaining to the experimental manipulation. That is, the experimenter 
explained that participants would momentarily listen to a short section of an audio-recorded 
conversation between a campus professor who studies psychiatric problems and a 25 year-old 
college alumnus who struggles with schizophrenia. Participants then listened to one of three 
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versions of a scripted, audio-recorded conversation between the first-author and either a young 
woman (“Jessica,” for female participants) or a young man (“Justin,” for male participants) 
recruited to enact the role of a person with schizophrenia. Both were seasoned actors in the 
college’s drama club. The first author was prominent in the audio-recorded conversation but was 
not involved in data collection. 
In all three conditions, the ostensible person with schizophrenia opened with a detailed 
description of personal struggles with several psychotic symptoms including paranoid delusions, 
delusions of reference, auditory hallucinations, and disorganized speech (duration = 1 min). In 
the control condition, playback of the audio-recording terminated upon completion of this 
description. In the continuum condition, the ostensible person with schizophrenia explained that 
psychiatric professionals have consistently told her/him that schizophrenia is fundamentally 
similar to the occasional experiences of normal people under stress (duration = 1 min). In the 
categorical condition, the ostensible person with schizophrenia explained that psychiatric 
professionals have consistently told her/him that schizophrenia represents a stark departure from 
normal functioning (duration = 1 min). All scripts are available upon request from the first 
author. Playback of the recordings was accompanied by presentation of a photograph of 
“Jessica” or “Justin” that gave the impression of candid capture mid-conversation. 
 Next, participants were given a bogus but authentic looking scientific article intended to 
bolster the information delivered in the audio-recordings (see Thibodeau et al., 2018). The first 
page of the article included highlighted material that participants’ were asked to carefully read; 
namely, the title and a short section reminiscent of an abstract called “Highlights,” which 
contained bulleted information on schizophrenia. Participants read one of three versions of the 
bogus article. In the control condition, participants read an article titled “Schizophrenia: Theory 
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and research evidence,” which described only symptoms of schizophrenia. In the continuum 
condition, participants read an article titled “Schizophrenia lies on a continuum: Theory and 
research evidence,” which described symptoms of schizophrenia and summarized evidence 
attesting to a continuum view of schizophrenia. In the categorical condition, participants read an 
article titled “Schizophrenia is a distinct category: Theory and research evidence,” which 
described symptoms of schizophrenia and summarized evidence attesting to a categorical view of 
schizophrenia. 
 Participants then completed the lexical decision task, the post-manipulation PANAS, the 
manipulation check, and the self-report measures of social distance, emotional reactions, and 
semantic differential stereotyped attitudes, in that order. After debriefing, participants were 
thanked for their participation and dismissed. 
3. Results 
3.1 Correlational Analyses 
 Consistent with previous research, participants’ endorsement of continuum and 
categorical beliefs predicted self-report variables capturing psychiatric stigma and momentary 
affect (see Table 1). Greater endorsement of continuum beliefs predicted less desire for social 
distance, less prosocial emotion, and weaker embrace of stereotyped attitudes, including 
stereotypes related to both dangerousness and unpredictability. In contrast, greater endorsement 
of categorical beliefs predicted marginally greater desire for social distance; marginally greater 
prosocial emotion; stronger embrace of stereotyped attitudes, including stereotypes related to 
both dangerousness and unpredictability; and marginally higher positive affect at the post-
manipulation, relative to the pre-manipulation, measurement. 
3.2 Preliminary Experimental Analyses 
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 We first sought to determine whether our randomization procedure yielded experimental 
groups that were balanced with respect to demographic and other key variables. There were no 
group differences for any demographic variables: age, F(2,132) = 0.85, p = 0.430; sex, χ2(2) = 
0.18, p = 0.915; ethnicity (proportion of White versus non-White participants), χ2(2) = 0.99, p = 
0.610; college major (proportion of psychology versus nursing versus other majors), χ2(4) = 3.02, 
p = 0.555. There were also no group differences in the proportion of participants who reported 
having family members with mental illness, χ2(2) = 0.50, p = 0.778. 
Table 2 displays all effects of the experimental manipulation. Manipulation check data 
indicated that the experimental manipulation was effective. Subsequent to the manipulation, 
groups differed in their endorsement of continuum beliefs, F(2,132) = 39.43, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 
0.37, and categorical beliefs, F(2,132) = 38.73, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.37, in the expected directions. 
 Effectiveness of the experimental manipulation notwithstanding, fourteen participants 
(10.4%; n = 2 control, n = 5 categorical, n = 7 continuum) were unable, at debriefing, to identify 
the group to which they had been assigned. These participants were excluded from all 
subsequent analyses, though the results are unchanged when all participants are included. 
3.3 Effects of the Experimental Manipulation on Psychiatric Stigma 
As expected, there was no evidence that the experimental manipulation affected 
psychiatric stigma (see Table 2): social distance, F(2,118) = 0.11, p = 0.894, ηp2 = 0.00; overall 
stereotyped attitudes, F(2,118) = 0.24, p = 0.788, ηp2 = 0.00; dangerousness stereotype, F(2,117) 
= 0.11, p = 0.896, ηp2 = 0.00; unpredictability stereotype, F(2,118) = 0.58, p = 0.563, ηp2 = 0.01. 
3.4 Effects of the Experimental Manipulation on Momentary Affect 
We followed published procedures for scoring and analyzing lexical decision data (e.g., 
Granqvist et al., 2018). Trials were deleted if they yielded participant responses that were (1) 
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incorrect, (2) too fast, defined as under 300 ms, or (3) too slow, defined as over 1500 ms. To 
control for nonspecific individual differences in overall reaction times (RTs), mean RTs to 
neutral trials were included as covariates in the models examining RTs to anxiety and death-
related words. 
As expected, for RTs to anxiety words, the omnibus effect of the experimental 
manipulation was significant, F(2,117) = 3.42, p = 0.036, ηp2 = 0.06. Follow-up contrasts 
indicated that the continuum group exhibited faster RTs than both the control, F(1,117) = 5.73, p 
= 0.018, ηp2 = 0.05, and categorical groups, F(1,117) = 4.61, p = 0.034, ηp2 = 0.04. 
For RTs to death-related words, the omnibus effect of the experimental manipulation was 
not significant, F(2,117) = 0.01, p = 0.986, ηp2 = 0.00. 
There was a near-significant omnibus effect of the experimental manipulation on self-
reported fear, F(2,118) = 3.01, p = 0.053, ηp2 = 0.05. Follow-up contrasts indicated that the 
continuum group reported significantly greater fear than the control group, F(1,118) = 5.73, p = 
0.018, ηp2 = 0.05, and marginally greater fear than the categorical group, F(1,118) = 2.86, p = 
0.093, ηp2 = 0.02. Omnibus effects involving self-reported anger and prosocial emotion were not 
significant (ps > 0.29). 
PANAS positive and negative affect scores were subjected to separate mixed analyses of 
variance, with group entered as a between-subjects factor and time (pre vs. post) entered as a 
within-subjects factor. For positive affect, there was a near-significant main effect of time, 
F(1,118) = 3.85, p = 0.052, ηp2 = 0.03, such that positive affect tended to decrease from the pre-
manipulation to the post-manipulation measurement. Both effects involving the group variable 
were not significant: main effect, F(2,118) = 0.89, p = 0.415, ηp2 = 0.02; group x time 
interaction, F(2,118) = 0.28, p = 0.753, ηp2 = 0.01. 
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 For negative affect, all effects failed to achieve statistical significance: main effect of 
time, F(1,118) = 0.26, p = 0.608, ηp2 = 0.00; main effect of group, F(2,118) = 0.46, p = 0.632, ηp2 
= 0.01; group x time interaction, F(2,118) = 1.12, p = 0.329, ηp2 = 0.02. 
4. Discussion 
The current study examined the effects of a novel kind of continuum intervention on 
measures of psychiatric stigma and momentary affect. Most continuum interventions employed 
to date have permitted participants to maintain some psychological distance from individuals 
with mental illness. In contrast, because our intervention brought participants psychologically 
closer to a target person with schizophrenia, we expected participants to exhibit an inflated sense 
of threat or anxiety that could undermine the effectiveness of the intervention. Results supported 
these predictions. We obtained no evidence that our continuum intervention affected psychiatric 
stigma. Moreover, the continuum group exhibited an amplified sense of threat; that is, greater 
self-reported fear and faster responses to anxiety-related words in a lexical decision task. In the 
lexical decision task, the continuum intervention’s effects were limited to the priming of lexical 
concepts related to anxiety/threat; no priming of lexical concepts related to death was 
documented. 
These findings suggest that scholarship on continuum intervention should take heed of its 
potential to amplify a sense of threat or personal vulnerability to mental illness, an outcome that 
could have a myriad of consequences about which we can only speculate. Some people may 
defensively reject the intervention, dismissing it as a way of managing an inflated sense of threat 
(see Liberman and Chaiken, 1992). People may find it difficult to attend to the intervention 
because of a focus on one’s own distress (see Compton, 2000). Perhaps it is even possible that, 
for some people, the intervention could lead to increased stigma. That is, feelings of increased 
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psychological closeness could prompt strong motives to search for characteristics that reestablish 
difference and thus a sense of safety (see Wahl, 1995, pp. 125-126). Moreover, Gergel (2014) 
argued that appraisals of similarity to people with mental illness could lead to increased 
perceptions of their laziness, blameworthiness, or weakness. In other words, if two people are 
fundamentally alike but only one has mental illness, it may be all too easy to invoke a flawed 
character to help explain the affected person’s plight. In the absence of constitutional or 
categorical difference, appraisals of a weak will may jump to the fore. Of course, all of this is 
highly speculative, but we believe that future work on continuum belief should take up these 
important and provocative questions. 
On the other hand, it is worth repeating that all of the beneficial effects of continuum 
intervention on psychiatric stigma heretofore documented are rather small (Corrigan et al., 2017; 
Schomerus et al., 2016; Thibodeau et al., 2018; Wiesjahn et al., 2016). Moreover, null effects 
were established here and elsewhere (Thibodeau, 2017). The extant evidence does little to 
support the prospects of designing stigma reduction programming with continuum belief at its 
center, though it may usefully assume a position at the periphery of interventions targeted 
elsewhere. Perhaps stigma reduction efforts would benefit from a redoubled focus on tried-and-
true interventions with well-documented efficacy. The documented stigma reduction effects of 
knowledge/familiarity (Kitchener and Jorm, 2002) or contact (Couture and Penn, 2003) are 
examples. Fresh innovation with respect to contact-related stigma reduction could especially 
yield fruit. Along these lines, we should note that although extended contact has documented 
efficacy in reducing outgroup hostility (e.g., Wright et al., 1997), very little is known about its 
effects in the psychiatric domain (but see West and Turner, 2014). 
We would also hasten to add that although our results do not support a stigma reduction 
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effect of continuum intervention, we are not arguing in favor of its conceptual opposite. That is, 
interventions that inflate appraisals of the “otherness” of individuals with psychiatric problems 
(e.g., “brain disease” conceptions of mental illness), are damaging in important ways (Haslam 
and Kvaale, 2015). 
Our correlational results largely mirrored published findings. That is, categorical beliefs 
predicted increased psychiatric stigma, whereas continuum beliefs predicted decreased 
psychiatric stigma. The divergence between the correlational and experimental findings 
(Thibodeau, 2017) is interesting. Evidence gathered to date suggests that continuum beliefs that 
people spontaneously arrive at on their own are related to decreased stigma, whereas attempts to 
manipulate these beliefs can be fraught with inflated appraisals of threat, anxiety, and perhaps 
defensiveness. We also uncovered an intriguing negative correlation between continuum beliefs 
and prosocial emotion (see also Thibodeau et al., 2018). It is possible that continuum beliefs strip 
people’s problems of the medical legitimacy that ordinarily justifies expressions of care and 
compassion. Interestingly, other research has found a positive correlation between continuum 
beliefs and prosocial emotion (Angermeyer et al., 2015; Schomerus et al., 2013). Possible 
reasons for this discrepancy await empirical attention. 
There are abundant avenues for future research on continuum belief. First, are there ways 
to capitalize on the promise of continuum intervention while at the same time minimizing the 
sense of threat that it stimulates? Sherman and Cohen (2002) reported that people are more 
receptive to threatening information when their self-worth is reinforced. Other ways of reducing 
feelings of threat associated with ingroup categorization of individuals with mental illness could 
valuably inform scholarship on continuum belief. As one example, telling participants that 
“healthy people can experience [psychotic] symptoms” (Wiesjahn et al., 2016) compels 
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participants to resituate “normal” into the territory of “abnormal.” What would be the 
consequences of instead asking participants to resituate “abnormal” into the territory of 
“normal,” perhaps by highlighting goals (e.g., work, relationships) that individuals with mental 
illness share with “normal” individuals? Could such an alternative approach reap the benefits of 
continuum intervention while also minimizing feelings of threat? Second, moderators of the 
relationship between continuum intervention and psychiatric stigma are ripe for exploration. Is 
continuum intervention more or less effective among people familiar or unfamiliar with mental 
illness? With or without histories of mental illness themselves? Among people high or low in 
traits that predict psychiatric stigma, such as belief in a just world? (Rüsch et al., 2010). Third, it 
is not clear whether the present findings would generalize to other psychiatric problems that are 
more common or perceived to be less serious. It is especially interesting to wonder how 
prevalence and severity might interact to predict threat responses. Which more strongly elicits 
feelings of threat – perceived vulnerability to less serious but more prevalent disorders (e.g., 
depression, anxiety) or more serious but less prevalent disorders (e.g., schizophrenia)? Fourth, 
future research might explicitly measure participants’ appraisals of their similarity to a target 
person with mental illness and evaluate the extent to which it predicts threat-related affect. 
Alternatively, variation in the degree of participants’ similarity to a target person with mental 
illness could be experimentally manipulated. Finally, it may be useful to directly compare the 
novel kind of continuum intervention we employed – which compels greater psychological 
closeness to an individual with mental illness – to the more conventional interventions heretofore 
employed in the published research literature (Corrigan et al., 2017; Schomerus et al., 2016; 
Thibodeau, 2017; Thibodeau et al., 2018; Wiesjahn et al., 2016). 
The current study had several strengths. First, our manipulation check data indicated that 
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our intervention was unusually potent, particularly compared to the mostly online continuum 
interventions carried out to date. These results argue strongly in favor of persuasive, laboratory-
based interventions that can offer strong tests of hypotheses surrounding continuum intervention 
effects. Second, we administered both explicit and implicit measures of psychiatric stigma and 
momentary affect. Scholarship on psychiatric stigma continues to over-rely on self-report 
measurement that is subject to well-known limitations. Use of implicit (e.g., Peris et al., 2008; 
Teachman et al., 2006) and concrete behavioral measures (e.g., Mehta and Farina, 1997; 
Thibodeau et al., 2018) is needed to achieve a more complete understanding of psychiatric 
stigma processes that manifest in the laboratory. 
The study was also subject to some weaknesses. First, our sample included an unusually 
small number of men. Second, we did not evaluate the time course of the inflated threat exhibited 
by the continuum group subsequent to the manipulation. As such, it is not clear how long these 
feelings of threat persist, though this knowledge would be useful in evaluating the overall impact 
of continuum intervention. Of course, the measurement of only short-term responses to stigma-
related interventions is problematic across the wide spectrum of psychiatric stigma research 
(Yamaguchi et al., 2013). Third, our strictly undergraduate sample limits the generalizability of 
the present results. Fourth, it is very likely that the increased accessibility of lexical concepts 
related to threat/anxiety in the continuum group reflects the momentary experience of these 
feelings. We have embraced the interpretation that these feelings arise from an appraisal of 
psychological closeness to an individual with schizophrenia, but we should acknowledge that 
other interpretations are possible. Our findings could alternatively reflect vicarious feelings of 
threat borne of empathic concern for the individual with schizophrenia featured in the interview. 
Finally, our hypothesis of null intervention effects on our stigma variables is unusual and 
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potentially problematic. On the other hand, we should point out that our findings offered 
consistent evidence in favor of the null hypothesis. Indeed, effect sizes (ηp2) for social distance, 
overall stereotyped attitudes, the dangerousness stereotype, and the unpredictability stereotype 
were .00, .00, .00, and .01, respectively. 
In sum, the current study demonstrated that a different kind of continuum intervention 
that compels psychological closeness to an individual with schizophrenia yields no beneficial 
effect on psychiatric stigma and inflates appraisals of threat and feelings of fear/anxiety. The 
present findings should valuably inform efforts to design stigma reduction programming 
centered on the manipulation of continuum beliefs.
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Table 1 
 
Bivariate Correlations between Continuum Beliefs, Categorical Beliefs, and Self-Report  
 
Variables (Psychiatric Stigma and Momentary Affect) 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Continuum Categorical 
 Beliefs Beliefs 
                                                ________________________________________ 
 
Psychiatric Stigma 
Social Distance -0.22* 0.16† 
Stereotyped Attitudes 
Overall -0.22** 0.25** 
Safe-Dangerous -0.19* 0.18* 
Predictable-Unpredictable -0.21* 0.21* 
 
Momentary Affect 
Fear -0.14 -0.02 
Anger -0.04 0.07 
Prosocial Emotion -0.27** 0.15† 
Pre-Post Change in PANAS Positive Affect 0.06 0.16† 
Pre-Post Change in PANAS Negative Affect 0.02 -0.09 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note. n = 135. The bivariate correlation between continuum beliefs and categorical beliefs was r 
= -0.61, p < 0.001. 
 
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.10
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Table 2 
 
Effects of the Experimental Manipulation (Control, Continuum, Categorical) on the 
 
Manipulation Check, Psychiatric Stigma, and Momentary Affect 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Control Continuum Categorical 
 Manipulation Manipulation Manipulation 
 _____________ _____________ _____________ 
 
 M (SE) M (SE) M (SE) 
                                                _____________________________________________________ 
 
Manipulation Check  
Continuum Beliefs 2.7 (0.09) 3.3 (0.08) 2.2 (0.09) 
Categorical Beliefs 2.6 (0.08) 2.2 (0.09) 3.2 (0.10) 
 
Psychiatric Stigma 
Social Distance 2.0 (0.08) 2.1 (0.08) 2.0 (0.08) 
Stereotyped Attitudes 
Overall 0.5 (0.10) 0.4 (0.06) 0.5 (0.10) 
Safe-Dangerous 0.9 (0.23) 0.8 (0.13) 0.8 (0.17) 
Predictable-Unpredictable 1.7 (0.25) 1.4 (0.19) 1.7 (0.23) 
 
Momentary Affect 
RTs to Anxiety Words 523.0 (6.78) 499.6 (7.00) 520.6 (6.79) 
RTs to Death Words 562.7 (7.72) 564.4 (7.98) 562.7 (7.73) 
Fear 1.6 (0.10) 1.9 (0.13) 1.7 (0.11) 
Anger 1.5 (0.09) 1.7 (0.10) 1.6 (0.08) 
Prosocial Emotion 3.5 (0.11) 3.4 (0.13) 3.5 (0.10) 
PANAS Positive Affect  
Pre-Manipulation 3.4 (0.09) 3.2 (0.13) 3.2 (0.13) 
Post-Manipulation 3.3 (0.14) 3.0 (0.13) 3.1 (0.14) 
PANAS Negative Affect 
Pre-Manipulation 1.6 (0.09) 1.6 (0.08) 1.8 (0.13) 
Post-Manipulation 1.6 (0.09) 1.6 (0.11) 1.6 (0.10) 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note. Means (SEs) reflect the original measurement scales. Manipulation check (1 = definitely 
disagree, 4 = definitely agree). Social distance (1 = definitely willing, 4 = definitely unwilling). 
Stereotyped attitudes (-6 = maximum stereotyped attitudes for “Average Person” versus target 
person, +6 = maximum stereotyped attitudes for target person versus “Average Person”). RTs 
reflect reaction times (in ms) in the lexical decision task; means are adjusted by the covariate 
(RTs to neutral words). Fear, anger, and prosocial emotion (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly 
agree). PANAS (1 = very slightly or not at all, 5 = extremely). 
